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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he 21st century is being marked by people on the 
move . . . But, ladies and gentlemen, the complexity of today’s dis-
placement goes well beyond the asylum-migration nexus . . . [F]or 
each centimeter the sea level rises, there will be one million more 
displaced.”1 
As climate change intensifies, countries around the world are 
witnessing its devastating effects.2 However, the impacts of cli-
mate change go far beyond images of melting ice caps and extreme 
weather headlines. Climate change is affecting the very nature of 
human movements in a way that is becoming “the greatest threat 
to human rights in the 21st century.”3 
Over the past decade, the risk of climate-induced displacement 
has reached critical levels, resulting in an emerging pattern of mi-
gration that will continue to increase at exponential levels.4 Ac-
cording to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s 2015 
Global Estimates Report, between 2008 and 2014, an average of 
 
1. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Opening Statement by Mr. António 
Guterres, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, at the Fifty-Eighth Session of the Exec. 
Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme (ExCom), Geneva, (Oct. 1, 2007), 
https://perma.cc/PJ2G-PZDP [hereinafter Guterres]. 
2. Jonathan Urry, Climate Change and Society, in WHY THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES MATTER 45, 52–53 (Johnathan Michie & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2015) 
(highlighting a three-fold increase in storm and flood events and using ‘state’ to 
mean ‘nation’ or ‘country’”). 
3. See Matthias Mueller, Climate Change: The Greatest Threat to Hu-
man Rights in the 21st Century, UNIV. COLL. LONDON: GLOB. GOVERNANCE INST. 
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/VE2P-AMT6; Climate Change – The Greatest 
Threat to Human Rights in the 21st Century, WORLD FUTURE COUNCIL (July 6, 
2016), https://perma.cc/96EF-Z7KX [hereinafter Climate Change Threat].  
4. Jeff Turrentine, Climate Change Is Already Driving Mass Migration 
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26.4 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters an-
nually.5 To put this figure into perspective, if the climate displaced 
persons during that period formed a new country, it would be the 
fourth largest in the world, close behind the population of the 
United States.6 In 2017, while one person was displaced due to 
armed conflict every two seconds,7 climate-related disasters dis-
placed one person every second.8 With each passing year, the num-
ber of people displaced by climate-related events will continue to 
rise.9 
It is estimated that by 2050 there will be more than 200 mil-
lion people displaced by climate change worldwide.10 This is eight 
times the number of refugees currently under the U.N. Office of 
the High Commissioner for Refugees’ (“UNHCR”) protection, and 
three times the total number of forcibly displaced people accounted 
for in 2017.11 By the end of the century, if countries maintain a 
“business-as-usual” approach to climate change regulation, the 
 
5. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., GLOBAL ESTIMATES 2015: 
PEOPLE DISPLACED BY DISASTERS 20 (2015), https://perma.cc/3ENU-PMVZ.  
6. Gulrez Shah Azhar, Climate Change Will Displace Millions in Coming 
Decades. Nations Should Prepare Now to Help Them, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 
18, 2017), https://perma.cc/7T6V-Z64P.  
7. Forced Displacement Above 68m, New Global Deal on Refugees Criti-
cal, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Jun. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/H7TF-
4H7N. 
8. Climate Victims – Every Second, One Person is Displaced by Disaster, 
RELIEFWEB (Jul. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/VS78-WF26. 
9. JOANNA APAP, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., THE 
CONCEPT OF ‘CLIMATE REFUGEE’: TOWARDS A POSSIBLE DEFINITION 1 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/26B9-HDLM; see generally Lin Taylor, One Person Every Second 
Displaced by Conflict, Disaster in 2016 - Report, REUTERS (May 22, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4LMF-AKDU (discussing the displacement of millions of Chinese 
and Philippine citizens due to climate-related weather events that will continue 
as global temperatures warm).  
10. See Migration, Climate Change and the Environment: A Complex 
Nexus, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://perma.cc/XC9U-FYQF (citing 200 mil-
lion as the most common estimate, although figures range from 25 million to one 
billion); accord Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: 
Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOB. 
ENVTL. POL. 60, 68 (2010) (stating that although various projections have been 
cited by different sources, this figure is the most widely cited one.). 
11. U.N. Figures at a Glance, supra note 8 (noting that in 2015 alone, 
over nineteen million people were subject to climate-induced displacement). 
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world will witness a 200% increase in asylum applications.12 As a 
result, states will have no choice but to change their approach to 
forcibly displaced people and begin to recognize the protections 
they will require.13  
Part II of this Article begins with a case study of the Pacific 
Island nations of Tuvalu and Kiribati. Small island nations are 
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change through rising sea 
levels and land degradation.14 Here, the Teitiota family will be in-
troduced as one example of the thousands of island nation resi-
dents who are subject to climate-induced displacement and have, 
in turn, become climate-displaced peoples (“CDPs”).15 This section 
will define CDPs and explore the multidimensional categories of 
climate displacement.16 
 
12. John Abraham, Study Finds that Global Warming Exacerbates Ref-
ugee Crises, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/696S-DFEC; see gen-
erally Anouch Missirian & Wolfram Schlenker, Asylum Applications Respond to 
Temperature Fluctuations, 358 SCI. 1610, 1610 (2017), https://perma.cc/48GA-
ZWYR. 
13. Roberta Cohen & Megan Bradley, Disasters and Displacement: Gaps 
in Protection, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 95, 95–96 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/X658-LL9L.  
14. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, https://perma.cc/88NV-KJ9Z 
(recognizing in its preamble that small island countries are especially vulnerable 
to floods, drought and desertification); see also Elizabeth G. Hanna & Lachlan 
McIver, Small Island States – Canaries in the Coal Mine of Climate Change and 
Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL HEALTH 181 (Colin Butler ed., 2016) (an-
alyzing the unique vulnerabilities of small island states and describing small is-
land states as “canaries in the coal mine of climate change.”); see, e.g., DAVID 
HODGKINSON ET AL., ‘THE HOUR WHEN THE SHIP COMES IN’: A CONVENTION FOR 
PERSONS DISPLACED BY CLIMATE CHANGE 1–2 (2010), https://perma.cc/GW87-
Z3AU (identifying the Maldives as a particularly “fragile” island vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change as more than 80% of the island is less than one meter 
above sea level). 
15. See HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–2 (recognizing the rising 
numbers of CDPs around the world); APAP, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that in the 
last decade, in the Pacific island nations of Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu, one in 
ten people have migrated due to the effects of climate change). 
16. Many terms such as “climate migrants,” “climate displaced persons,” 
and “climate refugees” have been used in the scholarly literature. See generally 
HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 13 (recognizing persons displaced by climate 
change as climate change displaced persons) . . . In this Article, individuals sub-
ject to climate-induced displacement will be referred to as CDPs. This term is 
more inclusive and comprehensive, and more accurately reflects the multifaceted 
challenges these individuals face.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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Although thousands of small island nation residents, like the 
Teitiota family, have or will become CDPs, they are left without 
any effective legal mechanisms to protect their rights.17 Part III 
addresses applicable international and regional law instruments 
and analyzes the gaps in the existing legal framework. One of the 
many reasons why existing legal mechanisms fall short in effec-
tively protecting the rights of CDPs is their failure to recognize the 
complex multidimensional nature of climate-induced displace-
ment.18 Existing legal frameworks address the initial stages of cli-
mate displacement but fail to acknowledge the long-term conse-
quences of displacement.19 
Part IV of this Article argues that rather than relying on in-
ternational agreements to address this multi-casual issue, the fo-
cus should shift to strengthening regional approaches to combat 
climate-induced displacement. Utilizing a bottom-up approach, 
these efforts would capitalize on the unique capacities of each state 
and acknowledge that regions will experience climate displace-
ment differently.20 Examples like the Nansen Initiative and its suc-
cessor, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, highlight the great 
potential regional strategies offer to address climate displacement 
and protect the rights of CDPs.21 In addition, this Part will explore 
 
17. Rana Balesh, Submerging Islands: Tuvalu and Kiribati as Case 
Studies Illustrating the Need for a Climate Refugee Treaty, 5 BARRY U. ENVTL. & 
EARTH L.J. 78, 81 (2015) (citing Jeremy Kelley, Climate Change and Small Island 
Stats: Adrift in a Raising Sea of Legal Uncertainty, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 2, 56 (2011)); see generally COSMIN CORENDEA, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE 
SINKING ISLAND REFUGEES (2016) (analyzing protection gaps in international law 
for protecting climate displaced peoples in Pacific island nations and recognizing 
that Pacific island nations are especially vulnerable to climate change impacts 
and have limited adaptation options). 
18. Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate 
Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 1, 9 
(2016), https://perma.cc/TC9W-LS4B; see also Marissa S. Knodel, Wet Feet March-
ing: Climate Justice and Sustainable Development for Climate Displaced Nations 
in the South Pacific, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 127, 153 (2012) (describing protection 
gaps for CDPs in international law as a “legal vacuum.”). 
19. See Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change 
Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y 502, 508–14 (2008). 
20. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3–4, 10. 
21. APAP, supra note 9, at 7. 
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the unique yet important role that the UNHCR can play in devel-
oping regional approaches to combating climate displacement.22 
For states to develop effective regional policies to address cli-
mate displacement, a specialized funding mechanism will be nec-
essary. Using the Green Climate Fund (“GCF”)23 as a model, Part 
IV also calls for the GCF to recognize climate displacement as a 
focus area for funding purposes. It proposes that, among the fund-
ing that is allocated to GCF’s Readiness and Preparatory Support 
Program,24 a portion of these funds should be designated to support 
regional solutions to address climate displacement. Through col-
laboration between UNHCR and the GCF, states would receive the 
support they require to fund bottom-up approaches to protect the 
rights of CDPs and address their unique climate displacement 
needs. 
II. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF 
CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 
A. Tuvalu and Kiribati: The Case of the Teitiota 
Family 
Tuvalu is an island nation located in the South Pacific Ocean, 
midway between Hawaii and Australia.25 This Polynesian island 
 
22. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTERS AND 
DISPLACEMENT 29 (Guy S. Goodwin & Jane McAdam eds., 2017), 
https://perma.cc/EN5S-FG8D [hereinafter Goodwin-Gill & McAdam].  
23. Who We Are: About the Fund, GREEN CLIMATE FUND, 
https://perma.cc/GE9Q-B9UC [hereinafter Green Climate Fund]. Adopted in 2011 
by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the GCF is 
a collaborative funding mechanism between states and various UN agencies 
working together to assist in financing mitigation and adaptation projects to com-
bat climate change. 
24. GREEN CLIMATE FUND, READINESS AND PREPARATORY SUPPORT 
GUIDEBOOK: ACCESSING THE READINESS AND PREPARATORY SUPPORT PROGRAMME OF 
THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND: AN INTRODUCTION AND HOW-TO GUIDE 4 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/UJ57-DUHF [hereinafter Readiness and Preparatory Support 
Program]. The GCF Readiness and Preparatory Support Program (“RPSP”) was 
established to support and assist developing countries to gain greater access to 
GCF resources by prioritizing funding for countries that are particularly vulner-
able to the adverse effects of climate change. 
25. Balesh, supra note 17, at 84. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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nation consists of three reef islands and six island atolls, compris-
ing a total of twenty-six square kilometers.26 Known as one of the 
world’s lowest-lying countries, Tuvalu’s elevation ranges from five 
meters to less than one meter above sea level.27 As climate change 
intensifies, Tuvalu faces a serious threat from increasing sea lev-
els.28 It is estimated that by the end of the century, Tuvalu will 
experience a rise of one to two meters in sea level, which will result 
in total inundation of the island.29 As a result, Tuvalu (and its 
11,000 residents) has become one of the first countries in the world 
to face the prospect of forcible relocation due to climate change.30 
Tuvalu is just one example of the several Pacific Island nations 
facing total inundation.31 Kiribati, another Pacific Island nation lo-
cated south of Hawaii, is also projected to face a similar fate.32 As 
sea levels continue to rise, Kiribati is estimated to be completely 
submerged by 2050.33 Like Tuvalu, many Kiribati residents are at-
tempting to seek refuge elsewhere while their governments declare 
states of emergency in response to climate change impacts.34 These 
 
26. Id.; Aram Kamali, Climate Refugees: Exposing the Protection Gap in 
International Law, CLIMATE INSTITUTE (Aug. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZV8A-
DJXX.  
27. Kamali, supra note 26.  
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Kent Tukeli, Disappearing Tuvalu: First Modern Nation to Drown?, 
WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/DR7Q-SASC; accord, Greg Harman, 
Has the Great Climate Change Migration Already Begun?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 
15, 2014), https://perma.cc/PR4H-AGBQ; Nick Noack, Has the Era of the ‘Climate 
Change Refugee’ Begun?, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/UNR7-
A453.  
31. See Darren James, Lost at Sea: The Race Against Time to Save the 
Carteret Islands from Climate Change, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/56AL-WL6W (discussing [t]he Carteret Islands that are located 
in the South Pacific off the coast of Papua New Guinea. Originally projected to be 
submerged by 2015, the Carteret Islands are currently 1.5 meters above sea level 
with a total land area of 0.5 square kilometers. As it continues to sink, it is esti-
mated that the Carteret Islands will be underwater by 2020); Katherine Butler, 
14 Islands Threatened by Climate Change, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://perma.cc/M5ZZ-GGLG (listing 14 island nations at risk of inunda-
tion due to the impacts of climate change and rising sea levels); accord Knodel, 
supra note 18, at 147. 
32. Balesh, supra note 17, at 80. 
33. Id.  
34. McAdam, supra note 18, at 7. 
7
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island nations are bracing for a climate-related disaster that will 
result in thousands being forcibly displaced.35 
The Teitiota family is one example of vulnerable island nation 
residents who are finding themselves at risk of being displaced.36 
Originally from Kiribati, the Teitiota family relocated to New Zea-
land in 2007, where they stayed until their visas expired in 2010.37 
Faced with the threat of deportation, the family applied for refugee 
status.38 Ioane Teitiota, his wife, and their three children sought 
refugee protection on the basis of “changes to [their] environment 
in Kiribati caused by sea-level-rise associated with climate 
change.”39 Five years later, and after several lower court dismis-
sals, this case found its way to the Supreme Court of New Zea-
land.40 The Supreme Court upheld all lower court decisions and 
denied the family refugee status.41 The Court held that the Teitiota 
family’s claim for protection was inconsistent with the definition of 
“refugee” within existing refugee law.42 Despite fearing for the 
safety of his family if forced to return to their submerging island 
nation, Ioane Teitiota and his family were returned to Kiribati.43 
Though the family was unsuccessful in securing protection as ref-
ugees, their attempt gained considerable media attention, as news-
paper publications around the world began recognizing the Teiti-
ota family as the “World’s First Climate Change Refugee[s].”44 
 
35. Id. at 9.  
36. Kamali, supra note 26; see also Jon Letman, Rising Seas Give Island 




39. KELLY BUCHANAN, NEW ZEALAND: “CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEE” CASE 
OVERVIEW 1, 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/93JW-ELCE.  
40. Id.  
41. Kamali, supra note 26; see generally AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 
800413 (Immigration and Protect. Trib.) at [97–98] per Burson B.L. (providing a 
detailed overview of the judicial history of the Teitiota family’s case). 
42. Kamali, supra note 26 (“environmental migrants can still ‘rely on the 
protection of their national government’”).  
43. Tim McDonald, The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change 
Refugee, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/4TU6-AD9H; see also Robert 
McLeman, Who Will Become the World’s First Climate Change Refugee?, GLOBE & 
MAIL (May 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/97QP-NPXE.  
44. McDonald, supra note 43; McLeman, supra note 43.    
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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Despite the international community’s nascent recognition of 
climate displaced peoples, the Teitiota family is not alone in seek-
ing refugee protection for climate displaced peoples.45 In fact, be-
tween 2000 and 2015 alone, more than twenty cases were brought 
before New Zealand and Australian courts by Tuvalu and Kiribati 
island residents.46 Each applicant sought refugee protection from 
the impacts of climate change, and all claims were denied.47 
B. Defining Climate Displaced Peoples 
Human migration as a response to changes in the environment 
is not a new concept.48 Angela Williams, a New Zealand lawyer and 
former law professor at the University of Sussex, explains that 
since the beginning of human civilization, environmental factors 
such as seasonal change and depletion of agricultural crops and 
natural resources have historically compelled populations to relo-
cate to new areas.49 However, as climate change has intensified, so 
have the reasons for human migration.50 It was not until the 1980s 
that the impacts of a rapidly changing climate on human migration 
began to be recognized at the international level,51 and the concept 
of CDPs began to materialize.52 
Climate displaced peoples can be defined as: 
persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of 
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely 
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their 
 
45. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 39, at 7 (discussing several unsuc-
cessful climate displacement cases). 
46. McAdam, supra note 18, at 5. 
47. Id. 
48. Williams, supra note 19, at 507.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 502. 
51. Id. at 506; see, e.g., Fabrice Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee: 
How to Face Environmental Migration? A publication series of U.N. UNIV. INST. 
FOR ENV’T & HUMAN SEC. 10–11 (2007) (noting that the connection between cli-
mate change and migration was formally recognized by the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme in 1985). 
52. Williams, supra note 19, at 506. 
9
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homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and 
who move either within their country or abroad.53  
This definition acknowledges the multidimensional nature of 
climate-induced displacement and recognizes the many factors 
that can cause this type of displacement.54 Some of these factors 
can include the CDPs’ reasons for migration, duration of migration, 
and migration in relation to state borders.55 Reasons for migration 
may include land degradation, water scarcity, or rising sea levels 
(like the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati).56 Duration of migration will 
depend on whether the choice to relocate will be temporary, long-
term, or permanent.57 All of these factors are essential to consider 
when attempting to define CDPs.58 
CDPs may experience sudden environmental changes, also 
known as “sudden-onset disasters,” as well as “[s]low-onset pro-
cesses.”59 Each type of event will result in different consequences 
and affect the nature and degree of the decision to migrate.60 CDPs 
who experience “sudden-onset disasters” such as a tsunami may 
become “temporarily displaced due to temporary environmental 
stress but [seek to] return to their homes once the area has been 
rehabilitated.”61 For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was 
an extreme “sudden-onset” climate event that displaced over five 
million people in 11 different countries in Asia and Africa.62 Many 
 
53. Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 17. Although this definition pro-
vided by the International Organization for Migration refers to “environmentally 
displaced peoples,” the elements of this definition appropriately identify the mul-
tifaceted challenges that CDPs face. Thus, the same definition will be referred to 
in this article to characterize CDPs. 




58. See generally Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a 
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 
10 GLOB. ENVTL. POLITICS 60, 62–63 (2010), https://perma.cc/5G79-27QD. 
59. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3. 
60. Id.  
61. Id.; Williams, supra note 19, at 506. 
62. Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 96; McAdam, supra note 18, at 
3. Note that terms such as “slow-onset processes” and “slow-onset events” may be 
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victims of this “sudden-onset” climate event were temporarily dis-
placed until homes were rebuilt, and communities rehabilitated.63  
In contrast, those who experience “slow-onset processes” in-
clude those who migrate “in search of a better quality of life as a 
result of progressive degradation of environmental resources.”64 
Residents like the Teitiota family of Pacific island nations such as 
Tuvalu and Kiribati would fall under this category. However, 
“[s]udden impacts” and “slow[-]onset events” are not mutually ex-
clusive categories; they are intrinsically linked and cannot easily 
be separated.65 These events can be so intertwined that it has 
prompted scholars like McAdam to argue that there is “no such 
thing as a ‘natural’ disaster” because “disasters are always contin-
gent on underlying, social, economic, political, and environmental 
factors.”66 Moreover, the implications of these disasters are not 
confined to state borders.67 As climate change continues, its im-
pacts will create transboundary concerns.68 
As a result, defining and categorizing CDPs is a difficult and 
complex task as the causes of climate-induced displacement are 
multidimensional in nature.69 Thus, “this range of varied interpre-
tations and consideration of different factors highlights many of 
the key challenges with the characterization and implementation 
of [this] concept[.]”70 The multidimensional nature of CDPs is one 
of the many reasons why residents such as the Teitiota family have 
difficulty seeking protection under existing legal mechanisms. 
 
63. Alan Taylor, Ten Years Since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/YY5Z-BM83 (illustrating “before and 
after” images of tsunami-affected communities in Indonesia and Thailand). 
64. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3; Williams, supra note 19, at 506. 
65. Andrea C. Berringer, Migration and Climate Change: Global Gov-
ernance Regimes and the Incorporation of Climate Change Displacement, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POLICY REGIMES: TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL 
LEGITIMACY 204 (Timothy Cadman ed., 2013), https://perma.cc/SNG5-RGQR. 
66. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3. 
67. Richard Hill, Climate Change, Population Movements and Govern-
ance: Case Studies in Response Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL 
POLICY REGIMES: TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 190 (Timothy Cadman ed., 
2013), https://perma.cc/EA5E-524D (“national borders [are] becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant . . . since rising temperatures and sea levels impact all nations”). 
68. Id.; see infra Part IV for an analysis of the distinction between inter-
nal displacement and cross-border displacement caused by climate-related 
events.   
69. See Williams, supra note 19, at 507. 
70. Id.  
11
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III. THE VOID IN THE EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The Teitiota family’s claim for protection failed because they 
were seeking to be recognized as refugees.71 This claim, and ulti-
mately all of the others brought between 2000 and 2015, were de-
nied because none of these claims were covered under any interna-
tionally recognized definition of “refugee.”72  This Part describes 
the existing international and regional legal mechanisms under 
which climate displaced peoples may seek protection. It will also 
highlight why these legal mechanisms fail to provide adequate pro-
tection for CDPs.73 
A. International 
1.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
Adopted in 1951, the Convention Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees (“Refugee Convention”) defines the term “refugee” and is rec-
ognized as “the basic and universal instrument relating to the sta-
tus of refugees.”74 The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as: 
 
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of 
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
 
71. BUCHANAN, supra note 39; see generally Jane McAdam, The Emerg-
ing New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 
3 MIGRATION STUD. 131, 133 (2015), https://perma.cc/SBA7-CUWK.  
72. Williams, supra note 19, at 508–11; see also McAdam, supra note 18, 
at 4. 
73. Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Pro-
posal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 
357 (2009) (explaining that no legal mechanism currently exists that effectively 
includes CDPs as a category of peoples who require protection against displace-
ment). 
74. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Prob-
lems in Africa Preamble, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 
https://perma.cc/MRS4-T7HW [hereinafter OAU Convention on Refugees]. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country. . .75 
 
Central to the definition of a refugee under the Refugee Con-
vention is the existence of a causal connection between the fear of 
persecution and one of the five enumerated grounds.76 Also known 
as the Nexus Clause, an individual seeking refugee protection 
must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of being per-
secuted for reasons based on a Convention ground.77 In addition, 
the individual must be outside of their country of origin and unable 
or unwilling to return due to their fear of persecution.78 
The Refugee Convention’s initial interpretation of refugee was 
intended to respond to the conflict-induced displacement crisis oc-
curring in Europe following World War II.79 For this reason, the 
definition of a refugee was “limited in scope to persons fleeing 
events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951.”80 Since the 
Refugee Convention was drafted as a “post-Second World War in-
strument,”81 some have argued that the original intent of the Ref-
ugee Convention was to protect only those whose political and civil 
rights had been violated.82 
The first and only amendment to the Refugee Convention ap-
peared in the 1967 Protocol, which removed the temporal and geo-
graphic restriction, and expanded this definition to provide “uni-
versal coverage.”83 Almost seven decades later, the Refugee 
 
75. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, https://perma.cc/B6Z4-NHBT [hereinafter Refu-
gee Convention]. 
76. Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause 
in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 266 (2002).  
77. Id. 
78. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 362. 
79. Heather Alexander & Johnathan Simon, “Unable to Return” in the 
1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change, 26 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 531, 556 (2014) (explaining that the intention of drafting the Refugee Conven-
tion was to address the plight of persons fleeing persecution after the World War 
II) [hereinafter Alexander & Simon]. 
80. Id. at 559. 
81. Refugee Convention, supra note 75, at 2. 
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Convention has 145 State parties, and it is understood as the “cen-
terpiece of international refugee protection.”84 
2.  The Nexus Clause Conundrum 
Although the Refugee Convention expanded the definition of 
refugee by removing its temporal and geographic restrictions, it 
still maintains a narrow interpretation, one that falls short of ef-
fectively protecting the rights of CDPs.85 The reason for this short-
coming is the requirement to establish a nexus between persecu-
tion and an enumerated Convention ground.86 Without the 
existence of this causal connection, an individual would not be en-
titled to protection under the Refugee Convention.87 While climate-
related disasters can be harmful and at times fatal, cases under 
the Refugee Convention have concluded that these events “do not 
meet the [legal] threshold of ‘persecution,’ which normally requires 
human agency.”88 Thus, the Nexus Clause in the definition of ref-
ugee excludes potential climate-related threats.89 As a result, the 
Refugee Convention does not acknowledge climate-induced dis-
placement, nor does the scope of its protection extend to CDPs.90 
Additionally, the UNHCR has been reluctant to categorize 
CDPs as “refugees” and neglects to acknowledge the inclusion of 
climate-related events within the traditional Convention frame-
work.91 This resistance stems from a fear that such inclusion “will 
 
84. Id.; see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], States Parties to 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, at 
1 (2015), https://perma.cc/LTG8-2CGU (listing State Parties as of Apr. 2015). 
85. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357. 
86. See generally Foster, supra note 76 (analyzing the causation stand-
ard established in refugee law between persecution and the enumerated Conven-
tion grounds).  
87. See id. 
88. McAdam, supra note 18, at 4; see also Berringer, supra note 65, at 
204 (noting the difficulty in identifying the causal links between climate change, 
persecution and human agency). 
89. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357–58; see also Knodel, 
supra note 18, at 138–39. 
90. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357–58; see also Goodwin-
Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 29.  
91. See NINA HALL, DISPLACEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MOVING BEYOND THEIR MANDATES 59 (Thomas G. 
Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2016) (referring to U.N. Secretary General Gu-
terres’s concern regarding the UNHCR adopting the term “climate refugee”); see 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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complicate and confuse the organization’s efforts to protect the vic-
tims of persecution and armed conflict”92 because climate-induced 
displacement cannot easily be separated from the various social 
and political grounds that the Refugee Convention considers.93 
Consequently, climate change has intersectional implications that 
can act as a “strategic security threat that sits alongside others like 
terrorism and state-on-state conflict[.]”94 Accordingly, “[t]he im-
pacts of climate change or disasters do not cause displacement on 
their own but, rather, interact with other economic, social, and po-
litical drivers that themselves affect migration[.]”95 Thus, the im-
pacts of climate change may exacerbate other security threats.96 
This can create additional state pressures and increase social, po-
litical, and economic instability, which may ultimately lead to 
armed conflict.97 In turn, these interrelated pressures may drive 
people to flee.98 
Climate change impacts are often interconnected with various 
social and political issues, which makes it difficult to separate con-
 
also Betsy Hartmann, Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rheto-
ric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse, 22 J. INT’L DEV. 233, 238 (2010). 
92. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statement at Nansen Conference 
on Climate Change and Displacement’ (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc/25ZV-
MQT6 [hereinafter Statement at Nansen Conference]. 
93. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3 (considering climate change a “threat 
amplifier”); see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 144 (recognizing that the incorpo-
ration of ‘“environmental’” into the definition of ‘“refugee’” is controversial be-
cause a direct causal link between climate change—as something independent 
from political and economic changes—and displacement is not easily discernible”); 
see generally, François Gemenne, Commentary, Climate Migrants are Refugees – 
Not Commodities, 33 THE ENVTL. F. 56, 56 (2016) (analyzing the distinction be-
tween “refugee” and “migrant” and asserting that “environmental migrants” are 
also non-conventional “political refugees”). 
94. Damian Carrington, Climate Change Will Stir ‘Unimaginable’ Refu-
gee Crisis, Says Military, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z6PX-
BFPG. 
95. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3. 
96. Carrington, supra note 94. 
97. McAdam, supra note 18, at 3; Onita Das, Climate Change and Armed 
Conflict: Challenges and Opportunities for Maintaining International Peace and 
Security Through Climate Justice, in CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL 
AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 411, 416 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016) 
(explaining that climate change is a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates the risk 
of security threats). 
98. Berringer, supra note 65, at 202–03. 
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ventional conflict-induced displacement with climate-induced dis-
placement.99 This creates increasing difficulty to categorize CDPs 
for rights-based protection100 and highlights that the simple inclu-
sion of climate-related events within the traditional Refugee Con-
vention framework does not address the multidimensional and in-
tersectional challenges that CDPs face.101 
B. Regional 
1.  Organization for Africa Unity and Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees 
Regional protection regimes such as the Organization for Af-
rica Unity (“OAU”) Convention on Refugees and the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees subsequently expanded the definition of 
“refugee.”102 This expanded definition acknowledges that a fear of 
persecution is not the only reason for individuals to flee their coun-
try of origin.103 For example, the OAU Convention, was adopted in 
1969 and acknowledged that: 
 
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing 
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of 
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his 
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another 
place outside his country of origin or nationality.104 
 
 
99. Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 6. 
100. Id. at 5.  
101. Williams, supra note 19, at 509. 
102. Refugee Convention, supra note 75, at 4. 
103. OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 71, at art. 1; Gillian 
McFadyen, The Contemporary Refugee: Persecution, Semantics and Universality, 
SPECIAL ISSUE: THE 1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION - 60 YEARS ON 9, 19 (2012) (de-
scribing the OAU Convention on Refugees as the “first ‘salient challenge’ to the 
idea that persecution is the fundamental criteria for refuge”). 
104. OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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Likewise, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted in 
1984, recognizes that “it is necessary to consider enlarging the con-
cept of a refugee[.]”105 It provides: 
 
[T]he definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for 
use in the region is one which, in addition to containing the ele-
ments of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes 
among refugees persons who have fled their country because 
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by general-
ized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive vi-
olation of human rights or other circumstances which have se-
riously disturbed public order.106 
 
As reflected in these definitions, the regimes of the OAU Con-
vention and Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expand the defini-
tion of “refugee” to those who have been subject to “events seriously 
disturbing public order[.]”107 According to Cohen and Bradley, 
“[g]iven the propensity of natural disasters to seriously disturb the 
public order, environmentally displaced persons who have crossed 
international borders could potentially be counted as refugees un-
der this definition.”108 Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration on Ref-
ugees expands this definition further to include events that cause 
“massive violation[s] of human rights.”109 McAdam argues that for-
cibly returning an individual to a disaster-affected area can consti-
tute a mass violation of human rights because it would “expose 
them to a real risk of death or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment.”110 As a result, these regional instruments offer a broader 
 
105. Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central 
America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees art. 3, ¶ 3 
(Nov. 22, 1984), https://perma.cc/M2NX-JE93 [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees]. 
106. Id. 
107. OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2; see also 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3. 
108. Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 106. 
109. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3. 
110. McAdam, supra note 18, at 5-6; see also McDonald, supra note 43 
(describing the fear that Mr. Ioane Teitiota has for his family’s life, the article 
cites him as stating, “I’m the same as people who are fleeing war. Those who are 
afraid of dying . . . The sea level is coming up, and I will die, like them. It will 
affect my life when the sea takes over my land. It will kill me and my family.”). 
17
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definition of the term “refugee” that arguably include protection for 
CDPs.111 
Nonetheless, despite this expanded scope of protection, nei-
ther framework explicitly mentions climate-induced displacement 
or the adverse implications of climate change. Although it is possi-
ble for climate-related events to “seriously disturb[] public or-
der,”112 without explicit reference to climate-induced displacement, 
these instruments fail to address the multidimensional conse-
quences of climate change and the unique impacts it can have on 
human displacement.113 As a result, both the OAU Convention and 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees fall short as resources to ad-
dress the unique protection needs of CDPs.114 
2.   Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and 
Kampala Convention 
Both the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement (“Guiding Principles”)115 and the African Union Conven-
tion for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Per-
sons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”)116 offer a broader scope of 
protection for displaced peoples by recognizing climate-related 
events as potential causes for displacement.117 Compared to the 
OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, the 
Guiding Principles and Kampala Convention are regional instru-
ments that have greater potential to offer protection for the rights 
of CDPs. 
 
111. Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 35. 
112. OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 74, at art. 1, ¶ 2; see also 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, supra note 105, at art. 3, ¶ 3. 
113. See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 32. 
114. Id. at 35–36.  
115. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights Fifty-Fourth 
Session, Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. 
Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998), 
https://perma.cc/EC54-NR58 [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
116. African Union, African Union Convention for the Protection and As-
sistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”), Oct. 
23, 2009, at pmbl. (entered into force Dec. 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/QLK4-PS2U 
[hereinafter Kampala Convention]. 
117. Williams, supra note 19, at 511; see also Cohen & Bradley, supra 
note 13, at 96. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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Adopted in 1998, more than a decade after Cartagena Decla-
ration on Refugees, the Guiding Principles have been recognized 
as an “important international framework for the protection of in-
ternally displaced persons[.]”118 The Guiding Principles define in-
ternally displaced peoples as those who: 
 
[H]ave been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in 
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of gener-
alized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized State border.119 
 
As stated within this definition, the Guiding Principles recog-
nize natural disasters as a potential cause for displacement.120 
Moreover, Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles states “[e]very hu-
man being shall have the right to be protected against being arbi-
trarily displaced from his or her home[,]”121 and affirms that this 
protection includes those who have been displaced by disasters.122 
As a result, the Guiding Principles affirm recognition and can pro-
vide rights-based protection for internally displaced CDPs.123 By 
incorporating refugee law into international humanitarian law 
and human rights law, “[t]he [Guiding] Principles affirm that 
“IDPs are entitled to the same human rights as other people in 
their countries, and that governments in cooperation with interna-
tional organizations are obliged to assist and protect them.”124 
Over a decade after the adoption of the Guiding Principles, the 
Kampala Convention reinforced the Guiding Principles and 
adopted the same definition for internal displacement.125 Like the 
 
118. Williams, supra note 19, at 511. 
119. Guiding Principles supra note 113. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 6. 
122. Id. at 6–7. 
123. Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 99. 
124. Id. 
125. Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, The Kampala Convention and Environ-
mentally Induced Displacement in Africa, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION 
INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
AND MIGRATION 4 (2011), https://perma.cc/7M7R-C4NJ; see Kampala Convention 
supra note 114. 
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Guiding Principles, the Kampala Convention, adopted in 2009, rec-
ognizes the implications that natural disasters can have on human 
displacement.126 However, unlike the Guiding Principles, the Kam-
pala Convention also acknowledges and explicitly makes refer-
ences to climate change as a cause of displacement.127 Article 5 of 
the Kampala Convention recognizes that states have an obligation 
to “take measures to protect and assist persons who have been in-
ternally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, includ-
ing climate change.”128 Recognized as a binding instrument in Af-
rican states, the Kampala Convention provides that states are 
responsible to protect those who are displaced by the implications 
of climate change.129 
Thus, the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention of-
fer unique legal protection because these instruments strive to tai-
lor international legal standards to the special needs of IDPs while 
establishing protection obligations during all phases of displace-
ment.130 These regional frameworks have the potential to provide 
protection for CDPs who have been internally displaced.131 Not 
only do they focus on the rights of those who are internally dis-
placed, but they also explicitly include those who have been dis-
placed by natural disasters and climate change.132 
Although both of these regional instruments have potential to 
protect CDPs who are internally displaced, it would be of no use to 
the Teitiota family and other island nation residents who find 
themselves crossing borders to seek refuge.133 While the majority 
of CDPs find themselves internally displaced during the initial 
phases of displacement, the interplay between sudden-onset and 
slow-onset climate events can result in cross-border migration.134 
 
126. Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at pmbl. 
127. Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at art. 5, ¶ 4; Abebe, supra 
note 125, at 1. 
128. Kampala Convention, supra note 120, at art. 5, ¶ 4. 
129. Id. The Kampala Convention is the first regional instrument in the 
world to impose this type of state obligation. APAP, supra note 9, at 7.  
130. Cohen & Bradley, supra note 13, at 108–09. 
131. Id. 
132. See Guiding Principles, supra note 119, at 5; see also Kampala Con-
vention, supra note 126, at art. 5, ¶ 4. 
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The initial phases of climate-induced displacement may be trig-
gered by a sudden-onset natural disaster; however, the fact that 
there is no protection provided for those who have crossed an in-
ternational border “fails to appreciate the true extent of the prob-
lem[.]”135 Extreme climate events such as saltwater intrusion and 
the degradation of agricultural lands can lead to small island na-
tions becoming completely uninhabitable.136 Such slow-onset 
events will adversely impact the livelihoods of those that live on 
the land, leaving them no choice but to seek refuge outside their 
national borders.137 Thus, “internal displacement may well lead to 
transborder displacement in the long term[.]”138 
To use Tuvalu as an example, the Tuvalu government declared 
the island in a state of emergency in 2011 due to severe water 
shortages.139 These shortages will not only impact food security, 
but also the livelihoods of those who live on the land.140 In 2019, 
while visiting the island nation, U.N. Secretary General, António 
Guterres described Tuvalu as one of the “frontrunners in the race 
against the [global] climate emergency.”141 As these concerns 
heighten, the land will soon become unsuitable for human habita-
tion causing residents to flee.142 
As a result, CDPs who are not “internally” displaced because 
they have crossed an international border would not receive pro-
tection under the Guiding Principles or the Kampala Convention. 
 
135. Id. 
136. McAdam, supra note 18, at 7–8; see also Justin T. Locke, Climate 
Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-Term 
Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171, 178 (2009) (emphasizing that slow-onset 
climate events have long-term consequences on food security, health, and natural 
resources).  
137. Williams, supra note 19, at 513. 
138. Id. 
139. McAdam, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
140. Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: 
Making Sense of the Debate 1 (UNHCR: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 
Working Paper No. 70, 2002), https://perma.cc/MTH7-T98R. 
141. ’Save Tuvalu; Save the World’; UN Chief Echoes Rallying Cry from 
Front Lines of a Global Climate Emergency, UN NEWS (May 29, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/N6UM-2JQQ. 
142. Id; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 132 (stating that heightened 
concerns related to security and livelihood will “reduce the ability of a nation and 
culture to exist in their original homeland”). 
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Consequently, there is no international framework that would pro-
vide cross-border CDPs rights-based protection they require.143 By 
only offering protection to CDPs who are internally displaced, 
these existing legal mechanisms offer a “piecemeal approach” to 
protecting CDPs because they fail to appreciate the long-term con-
sequences of climate change and the complex multi-layered phases 
of climate displacement.144 The protection obligations established 
under the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention only 
offer a temporary domestic solution to an otherwise increasing and 
long-term international crisis.145 
IV. PROPOSED REGIONAL RESPONSES TO 
CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 
The fact that existing legal mechanisms fail to consider the 
rights of CDPs does not mean that CDPs are any less worthy of 
protection, nor does it delegitimize their claims for refuge.146 In-
stead, this fundamental void in legal protection illustrates that 
CDPs are unique and must be considered through a different pro-
tection lens.147 As a result, this legal gap “recognizes and demon-
strates the need for a more contemporary and innovative ap-
proach”148 for CDPs. 
The multidimensional nature of climate displacement and the 
difficulty in separating climate displacement from other socio-eco-
nomic and political drivers further complicates attempts to formu-
late an overarching international agreement that effectively pro-
tects the rights of CDPs.149 Identifying the multi-layered phases of 
 
143. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 73, at 357.  
144. APAP, supra note 9, at 7; see also Williams, supra note 19, at 513. 
145. APAP, supra note 9, at 6–7; Williams, supra note 19, at 503; see also 
UNHCR, The Warsaw Intern’l Mechanism For Loss And Damage Associated With 
Climate Change Impacts, Task Force on Displacement Activity II.4, Mapping of 
Existing International and Regional Guidance and Tools on Averting, Minimiz-
ing, Addressing and Facilitating Durable Solutions to Displacement Related to the 
Adverse Impacts of Climate Change, at 45 (Aug. 2018) [hereinafter Warsaw Task 
Force] (acknowledging that existing legal instruments fail to consider the long-
term consequences of climate change because they “focus on the present and im-
mediate future, with relatively short-term time horizons”). 
146. See Williams, supra note 19, at 509; see also Statement at Nansen 
Conference, supra note 92. 
147. Williams, supra note 19, at 509; see also Hill, supra note 67, at 190. 
148. Williams, supra note 19, at 509. 
149. Id. at 512–13. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/3
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climate displacement will depend on each state’s particular vulner-
abilities and their capacities to address climate displacement.150 
Thus, the creation of a “one-size-fits-all” international approach to 
addressing climate displacement would not adequately protect the 
unique rights of CDPs.151 Instead, what is needed are carefully 
crafted regional solutions that are capable of acknowledging the 
particular needs of states and CDPs. 
This Part proposes solutions to this need for more regional ap-
proaches to address climate displacement. First, it highlights the 
value of regional solutions and provides an example of an existing 
and effective regional framework. It then explores the unique role 
that UNCHR can play in the creation of regional approaches and 
recommends an innovative funding option that can support states 
in the development of regional climate displacement policies. 
A. Proposal for “Bottom-Up” Reform 
1. The Value of Regional Solutions 
In a speech delivered to the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme in September 2018, U.N. Secretary-General António Gu-
terres acknowledged the multidimensional nature of climate-in-
duced displacement and recognized the critical need to not only 
address sudden-onset climate events, but also underlying slow-on-
set events.152 However, due to its multi-layered consequences, “cli-
mate change remains controversial given its cross-cutting reach 
from environmental and social impacts, through to economic and 
political policy[.]”153 
Recently, there have been a number of international initia-
tives that recognize the interlinkages between climate change and 
 
150. Hill, supra note 67, at 198–99. 
151. JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2012). 
152. See generally António Guterres, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Secretary-Gen-
eral’s Remarks on Climate Change [as delivered] (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/FL6D-U3FV. 
153. Williams, supra note 19, at 517. 
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displacement.154 For example, the Global Compact for Safe, Or-
derly and Regular Migration (“Global Compact”), adopted on De-
cember 10, 2018 and developed under the United Nations, is an 
“intergovernmentally negotiated agreement” which seeks “to cover 
all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and compre-
hensive manner.”155 The Global Compact refers to sudden-onset 
and slow-onset climate events and recognizes these events as 
causes of forced displacement.156 
Although the Global Compact was formally adopted in 2018, 
its commitments are non-binding and have yet to be imple-
mented.157 Moreover, despite its passive recognition of climate-re-
lated events, there is yet to be any mention of how this instrument 
will assist states in addressing climate displacement at a regional 
level.158 Thus, when it comes to international agreements “there is 
a risk that a one-size-fits-all response could downplay the cultural 
 
154. See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 5 (referring to a 
number of recent international initiatives and agreements including the Sustain-
able Development Goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the 
World Humanitarian Summit, and the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants). 
155. Global Compact for Migration, U.N. REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS, 
https://perma.cc/38YG-R3JY. 
156. Global Compact for Migration, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, at 9, 12 (July 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8H3K-V39A; see 
also Carolyn Beeler, UN Compact Recognizes Climate Change as Driver of Migra-
tion for First Time, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9K9B-8TQA 
(stating that the Global Compact is recognized as the first global agreement to-
wards a common approach to international migration). 
157. Global Compact on Migration Formally Adopted in Marrakech, THE 
N. AFRICA POST (Dec. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/7X98-9SCJ; see also General As-
sembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering, 
UN NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/PBF8-FCRU. 
158. SARAH OPITZ STAPLETON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT: THE NEED FOR A RISK-INFORMED AND COHERENT APPROACH 27 
(2017), https://perma.cc/27ZC-B6JE; see also Tim McDonnell, The Refugees The 
World Barely Pays Attention To, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/R3PK-B6TM (statement of Nina Hall) (“[T]he language in the 
compacts is too vague to spur much progress. . . neither compact will be legally 
binding.”) (statement of Steve Trent) (“The global compacts are a start, but it’s 
clear that they’re not enough.”); Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 44 (stat-
ing that although there are several international instruments that recognize the 
inherent link between the implications of climate change and human displace-
ment, “relatively few of them are fully dedicated to the issue of averting, minimiz-
ing, addressing, and/or facilitating durable solutions to displacement related to 
climate change and disaster”). 
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and livelihood needs of displaced communities and local knowledge 
bases for adaptation.”159 
Therefore, a regional approach is needed to address climate-
induced displacement.160 The ability of a community to recover 
from both sudden and slow-onset implications of climate change 
will depend on that particular community’s resilience and coping 
capacity.161 As such, each state will have its own “tipping point”162 
and will experience the impacts of climate change differently based 
on the resources and protections in place within each state.163 
While climate change impacts are international in scope and trans-
boundary in nature, the immediate impacts will be experienced at 
a regional level.164 
A bottom-up approach would allow for a more inclusive pro-
cess, giving regions the opportunity to gauge the varying capacities 
of each state and analyze the climate-related concerns specific to 
each region.165 Given the regional impact of climate change, focus 
should instead be placed on strengthening national policies.166 This 
approach would provide states with the chance to not only work at 
their own pace, but to also be flexible when adopting and imple-
menting policies.167 As a result, the rights of CDPs are better rec-
ognized and protected when their needs are considered through a 
more localized framework.168 The UNHCR further endorses this 
regional approach.169  When speaking on behalf of the agency in 
 
159. McAdam, supra note 151, at 7; see also Warsaw Task Force, supra 
note 145, at 45 (stating that existing international instruments inadequately ad-
dress the unique human rights risks that climate displaced populations face, and 
that more regional policies are needed that encourage “migration with dignity” 
and that are sensitive to the cultural heritage and various capacities of states).  
160. Williams, supra note 19, at 512 (advancing a more bottom-up ap-
proach to strengthen national policies); Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 
47.  
161. Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 14. 
162. Id. at 33 n.136. 
163. See generally id.; see also Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 
45; Knodel, supra note 18, at 133 (noting that an island’s state of vulnerability 
can depend on its “existing economic, social, and physical conditions”). 
164. Williams, supra note 19, at 518. 
165. Id. at 521. 
166. Id. at 520–23; Warsaw Task Force, supra note 145, at 45–46. 
167. Williams, supra note 19, at 511. 
168. See id. 
169. Alister Doyle, World Needs Refugee Re-Think for Climate Victims: 
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2011, Antonio Guterres stated that when combating climate-in-
duced displacement, the “primary responsibility for the protection 
and well-being of affected populations will . . . rest with the states 
concerned.”170 
Consequently, this bottom-up approach becomes “a system 
that instead recognizes the idea of climate change displacement at 
an international level, while leaving the detail of agreement and 
degree of engagement to national policies.”171 Regional approaches, 
such as the Nansen Initiative, and its successor, the Platform on 
Disaster Displacement, allow states to identify these tipping points 
and encourage states to work together to create action plans that 
enhance resilience.172 
2.   Leveraging Existing Instruments to Develop an 
Effective Regional Framework 
The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displace-
ment demonstrate the value of regional policies and their potential 
in framing a bottom-up rights-based protection regime.173 Estab-
lished in 2012, the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-
Border Displacement (“Nansen”) was a three-year intergovern-
mental strategy led by the governments of Norway and Switzer-
land.174 Using a “bottom-up consultative approach,”175 Nansen 
sought to “build consensus on key principles and elements to ad-
dress the protection and assistance needs of persons displaced 
across borders in the context of disasters, including the adverse 
effects of climate change.”176 Within its three-year span, Nansen 
engaged in seven sub-regional consultations involving regions 
throughout the world.177 These consultations resulted in the crea-
tion of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced 
 
170. Id. 
171. Williams, supra note 19, at 520. 
172. Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to The Platform on Dis-
aster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disas-
ters and Displacement, 39 U. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 1518, 1520 (2017). 
173. Id. 
174. THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-
BORDER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
VOLUME 1 6 (2015) [hereinafter NANSEN INITIATIVE]. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See McAdam, supra note 172, at 1520–21. 
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Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change 
(“Agenda”).178 
Endorsed by 109 governments, the purpose of the Agenda is to 
offer a comprehensive “toolbox of concrete measures and effective 
practices that governments can implement now to avoid displace-
ment . . . and to protect and assist those who are displaced.”179 
Through these measures, the Agenda calls on states to place more 
focus on climate adaptation plans and to strengthen disaster risk 
reduction measures.180 
While Nansen formally reached the end of its three-year man-
date in 2015, it inspired the creation of its successor, the Platform 
on Disaster Displacement (“PDD”).181 The PDD, which launched in 
May 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit, continues to ad-
vance the objectives of the Agenda originally created by Nansen.182 
The purpose of PDD is to assist states in implementing the Agenda 
by forming state-led partnerships with various stakeholders and 
agencies, including the UNHCR.183 
Like its predecessor, PDD embraces the multidimensional na-
ture of climate displacement.184 By acknowledging the value of re-
gional solutions, PDD aims to address the voids in existing refugee 
law.185 Rather than endorse a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach, 
PDD “focuses on the integration of effective practices by states and 
(sub-)regional organizations into their own normative frameworks 
in accordance with their specific situations.”186 As part of its com-
 
178. Id. at 1524. 
179. McAdam, supra note 18, at 10 (internal quotations omitted). 
180. Id. 
181. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1520. 
182. Our Response, PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, 
https://perma.cc/TLA3-J3HU [hereinafter Platform on Disaster Displacement Re-
sponse]. 
183. See Why UNHCR is Taking Action on Climate Change Displace-
ment, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (2017), 
https://perma.cc/6PRQ-75SB (noting UNHCR’s endorsement of support for the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement).  
184. Walter Kälin, The Nansen Initiative: Building Consensus on Dis-
placement in Disaster Contexts, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 5, 5 (2015). 
185. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1525. 
186. PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, COORDINATION UNIT, 
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prehensive toolbox, the Agenda offers resources for states to pro-
vide humanitarian visas, as well as temporary protection and stays 
of deportation arrangements for CDPs.187 The Agenda recognizes 
the adverse implications of slow-onset climate events, and for this 
reason, recommends that states should provide voluntary migra-
tion opportunities so that residents are given the choice to relocate 
in anticipation of future environmental harm.188 
The Agenda also recognizes that a holistic approach must be 
taken when advancing voluntary migration opportunities to en-
sure that these options are attainable to all CDPs.189 Not all volun-
tary migration options will provide the necessary protection that 
CDPs need, and some maintain strict eligibility requirements that 
may exclude many CDPs.190 For example, New Zealand’s Pacific 
Access Category (“PAC”) is a voluntary migration and resettlement 
program.191 Recognized as a special “immigration deal”192 between 
several Pacific island nations and New Zealand, PAC provides per-
manent residence annually to a set number of residents from Fiji, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kirbati.193 However, to be eligible for PAC, one 
must not only have a minimum level of English, but must also meet 
a minimum income level and basic health requirements.194 These 
requirements were designed to ensure that once relocated, individ-
uals would be able to sustain employment, and thus, a livelihood.195 
Although PAC has supported many island nation residents and 
families seeking to relocate and resettle elsewhere, not everyone 
will be able to meet the strict PAC requirements.196 
 
187. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1524; see W.H., Why Climate Migrants 
Do Not Have Refugee Status, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9YA3-RF96. 
188. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1543. 
189. Kälin, supra note 184, at 5. 
190. Williams, supra note 19, at 516. 
191. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1544. 
192. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AUSTRALIA, CLIMATE JUSTICE: A FAIR SHARE 
OF THE ATMOSPHERE 19 (2006), https://perma.cc/QZ3S-PDJ9. 
193. McAdam, supra note 172, at 1544. 
194. See John Gibson et al., How Pro-Poor is the Selection of Seasonal 
Migrant Workers from Tonga Under New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Em-
ployer Program?, 23 PACIFIC ECON. BULL. 187, 197 (2008).   
195. See id. at 197–98. 
196. Knodel, supra note 18, at 158 (“PAC remains a limited and struc-
tured migration program rather than a program to address climate-displaced per-
sons.”); Williams, supra note 19, at 515 (noting the protection gaps of PAC due to 
its strict eligibility requirements that often exclude many residents).  
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Since the Teitiota family was returned to Kiribati after their 
claim for refugee status was denied, Ioane Teitiota has been unable 
to find employment.197 Without basic income, CDPs like the Teiti-
ota family would not be eligible for voluntary migration under 
PAC. Consequently, the PDD recognizes that voluntary migration 
opportunities must be addressed with care as their effectiveness 
will depend on the varying capacities of each state.198 By under-
standing the regional challenges of states, PDD recognizes the 
challenges that can arise when creating voluntary migration op-
portunities.199 As a result, PDD encourages more inclusive, sus-
tainable migration opportunities, so that programs like PAC do not 
leave people behind.200 
Nansen is an example of the product of regional collaborative 
efforts to address climate-induced displacement.201 The use of re-
gional consultations and collaborations allowed Nansen to create a 
broad Agenda that is still applicable and effective on a regional 
level.202 Its successor, PDD, continues to advance the goals of Nan-
sen; these state-led initiatives “harness[] regional cooperation be-
tween states and build[] on existing geopolitical, economic, cul-
tural, and environmental relationships that already exist within 
many regional frameworks.”203 Such an approach may encourage 
good practices between states where ideas and initiatives can be 
shared and exchanged for the benefit of the entire region.204 
 
197. McDonald, supra note 43. 
198. APAP, supra note 9, at 3 (“Ensuring that climate-induced planned 
resettlement is dealt with humanely and effectively will require careful policy 
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B. The UNHCR and Potential Funding Avenues 
1.  The Role of the UNHCR 
Although the UNHCR may be reluctant to incorporate CDPs 
into a Convention refugee protection framework, and instead en-
dorses regional initiatives, this does not mean that it absolves itself 
from carrying any responsibility in the protection of CDPs. As U.N. 
Secretary-General António Guterres noted, the “UNHCR is not a 
migration management agency and does not want to become one. 
But to be able to fulfil our mandate, we must recognize the mixed 
nature of many present-day population flows.”205 Considering that 
climate-induced displacement is a present-day migration concern, 
there is a potential opportunity for UNHCR to play an important 
protective role.206 
Although the agency’s mandate focuses on reactive protection 
measures, the agency nonetheless recognizes the multi-layered 
challenges that accompany climate-induced displacement and is 
aware of CDPs’ current and emerging protection needs.207 There-
fore, “the key is to find ways in which UNHCR’s expertise can add 
value to, and complement, the roles of other actors so as to enhance 
protection . . . ”208 
With almost 70 years of knowledge and practical experience in 
protecting the rights of refugees, the UNHCR has potential to play 
a critical role in addressing CDP protection, both in a normative 
and operational sense.209 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that 
“its credibility and authority will allow it to develop pro-active and 
innovative initiatives . . . ”210 As a result, UNHCR can provide 
“‘value-added’ [support], where its experience and expertise have 
much to offer . . . ”211 Through offering this experience, one pro-
posal has been to call on the UNHCR to assist in developing a 
United Nations Special Rapporteur with a specific focus on climate 
 
205. Guterres, supra note 1. 
206. Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 22, at 26; see also Berringer, 
supra note 65, at 214 (noting the potential “unique” role UNCHR can play in ad-
dressing climate displacement). 
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displacement.212 A UN Special Rapporteur can assist states by en-
suring proper oversight and coordination in the development of re-
gional policies.213 
UNHCR also has a critical role to play in increasing global 
awareness of the urgency of addressing climate displacement. To 
fulfill this objective, the agency must start by working towards nor-
malizing appropriate terminology used to characterize peoples af-
fected by climate-induced displacement.214 Despite its reluctance 
to adopt CDPs within the conventional legal framework, it is still 
critical that international policies and initiatives “at the very least 
acknowledge the link between climate change and displacement 
and recognize the resulting problem.”215  Only after effective and 
appropriate terminology become normalized within the global con-
text can the rights of CDPs be properly recognized within effective 
regional legal frameworks.216 
2.  Creating a Climate Displacement Category Under 
the Green Climate Fund 
With the help of UNHCR, climate-induced displacement can 
become recognized terminology within the language of refugee 
rights protection.217 This recognition can help to further legitimize 
regional approaches initiated by states.218 For these regional 
frameworks to come into fruition, collaboration between the 
UNHCR and states must occur to formulate a comprehensive and 
sustainable funding mechanism. Although this type of financing 
instrument may not currently exist, states may look to other fund-
ing models for inspiration. The GCF assists in financing mitigation 
and adaptation projects related to climate change and is the result 
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of effective collaboration between states and various UN agen-
cies.219 Although it does not currently have a specific fund that ad-
dresses climate displacement, the GCF may have potential to as-
sist in creating such a fund. 
The GCF was formally adopted at the 2011 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Durban, Africa.220 Under the man-
date of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”), the GCF was established to create an innovative and 
ambitious funding mechanism that seeks to “reshape the global ar-
chitecture of climate change financing.”221 Recognized as “a legally 
independent institution,”222 the GCF is supported by an independ-
ent Secretariat and is headed by the Green Climate Board, which 
is comprised of 24 members.223 Within the Board, there is an equal 
composition of members from developed and developing country 
parties.224 Among the developing country members, the GCF’s 
mandate guarantees representation by relevant UN regional 
groupings, as well as, representation from small island nations and 
least developed countries.225 From the Board’s composition alone, 
the GCF focuses on regional approaches to address the impacts of 
climate change. 
As the GCF’s interim trustee, the World Bank is responsible 
for holding the Fund’s financial assets and preparing its financial 
records and statements.226 The World Bank does not make deci-
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sions on behalf of the GCF; instead, it administers the Fund’s as-
sets in accordance with the Green Climate Board’s decisions.227 
The GCF’s first “resource mobilization” period began in 2014 and 
is still in process, receiving pledges on an ongoing basis.228 The 
Fund’s main investments are provided in the form of grants and 
loans that are primarily funded by developed country parties to the 
UNFCCC.229 As of May 2018, GCF has received financial pledges 
from 43 state governments and nine developing country parties.230  
Since 2014, the total amount of signed pledges raised has equaled 
10.3 billion dollars, with the United States, Japan, United King-
dom, and France as its top donors.231 Since its inception, the GCF 
has made significant progress in mobilizing resources and working 
towards investing in combating climate change through regional 
mitigation and adaptation projects. For example, by the end of 
2017, the GCF amassed over $633 million in resources that have 
aided in implementing 19 regional projects worldwide.232 
The GCF Readiness and Preparatory Support Program 
(“RPSP”) was established in 2014 to help developing countries gain 
greater access to GCF resources.233 Any country party may apply 
to the RPSP; however, over half of funding allocated for the RPSP 
is reserved for developing countries identified by UNFCCC as be-
ing particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.234 These countries include less developed countries, small 
island states, and African States.235 RPSP provides up to $3 million 
per country and up to $1 million per year to assist states in creat-
ing national adaptation plans, and through the RPSP, the GCF 
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https://perma.cc/5EXV-8A3U (providing a detailed chart of pledges and contribu-
tions GCF has received as of May 8, 2018.) 
231. See id. 
232. Green Climate Fund, supra note 23. 
233. Readiness and Preparatory Support Program, supra note 24. 
234. Id. 
235. Id.; see also Knodel, supra note 18, at 143 (noting that compared to 




294 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 36 
aims to “support effective, country-driven adaptation activities”236 
that consider the unique vulnerabilities and capacities of each 
state to address climate change.237 As of 2019, the RPSP has 
worked with 135 countries and is “set to become the largest global 
support programme made available to developing countries to en-
hance access to climate finance in support of their efforts to combat 
climate change.”238 
Through a focus on regional support and representation, the 
GCF has placed important emphasis on investing in national adap-
tions plans to combat climate change, particularly within vulnera-
ble countries, such as small island states.239 Additionally, the 
RPSP ensures that vulnerable states have access to GCF’s re-
sources and multilateral funds.240 Although the RPSP provides this 
additional support for states, it has yet to recognize climate dis-
placement as a focus area in need of funding. With such a compre-
hensive climate change funding mechanism already in place, the 
RPSP offers promise to provide a funding platform that can assist 
states in developing adaptation plans that address climate-induced 
displacement.241 Thus, this Article proposes the RPSP designate a 
portion of its financial resources to assist states in developing na-
tional adaption plans focused on addressing climate displacement. 
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By creating a designated climate displacement funding cate-
gory with the RPSP, this proposal can open the door to building of 
partnerships between UNHCR and UNFCCC and can encourage 
further collaboration between these agencies and regional states. 
Along with an appointed UN Special Rapporteur on climate dis-
placement to aid in coordination, a designated climate displace-
ment fund under the auspices of the GCF would provide a strong 
foundation to support states’ efforts to develop effective regional 
initiatives that seek to protect the rights of CDPs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The implications of climate change pose significant threats to 
populations worldwide.242 With every second that passes, yet an-
other person is displaced by a climate-related event.243 Despite this 
reality, there is no effective legal framework to protect CDPs.244 
Consequently, CDPs like the Teitiota family have no legal mecha-
nisms to protect their rights. Existing legal frameworks are inade-
quate as they neglect to address the unique challenges CDPs face 
and fail to recognize the complex multidimensional nature of cli-
mate induced displacement. 
The impacts of climate change will be felt at a regional level, 
and thus, what is needed are regional approaches to address this 
complex form of human displacement.245 States are better 
equipped to understand the unique challenges of climate displace-
ment and can better appreciate the diverse and varying vulnera-
bilities of CDPs.246 This bottom-up approach to addressing climate-
induced displacement has potential to encourage collaboration 
among states, without causing states to feel the pressure to con-
form to a top-down “one-size-fits-all” approach.247 
Along with the experienced oversight of the UNHCR, there is 
potential for states to collaborate with funding initiatives like the 
Green Climate Fund. By crafting a designated funding category 
under an instrument like the GCF, states will have a platform from 
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which to advance and implement effective regional policies to ad-
dress climate displacement. Thus, through regional-based initia-
tives, small island nation residents like the Teitiota family, and 
CDPs everywhere would receive the legal recognition and rights-
based protection they rightfully deserve. 
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